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Commitment to Democracy in 
Mozambique: Performance Evaluations 
and Cognition. 
 







This study explores the nature of Mozambicans’ commitment to democracy by 
testing and examining cognitive and performance evaluation factors, using Round 
2 of the Afrobarometer survey. It finds that Mozambicans are less committed to 
democracy than many other Africans but their levels of procedural understanding 
of democracy are higher. My main findings are as follows: First, levels of 
information are the main source of popular commitment to democracy. Second, 
both evaluations of economic and political performance matter for Mozambicans’ 
commitment to democracy. Third, the effects of political performance matter more 
than economics. Fourth, people who have high levels of information (from news 
media use and formal education), discuss politics with friends or neighbors and 
obtain their information from relatively more independent sources (such as 
participation in collective action and contacting religious leaders) are more likely 
to be committed democrats. Fifth, procedural understandings of democracy are 





This paper is a condensed version of my Master thesis in Political Studies at the 
University of Cape Town. It deals with popular commitment to democracy in 
Mozambique and its likely sources using public opinion survey data. The paper is 
organized as follows. First, it provides the relevance for studying commitment to 
democracy in Mozambique, the hypotheses and arguments, the importance of 
commitment to democracy, its potential explanatory factors and the study’s 
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research design. Second, it describes the patterns of understandings of and 
commitment to democracy comparing Mozambicans with other Africans. Third, it 
tests and examines the effects of levels and sources of information and cognitive 
engagement on understandings of and commitment to democracy. Fourth, it probes 
the impacts of economic and political performance evaluations considering the 
effects of cognitive factors, including levels and sources of information, cognitive 
engagement, as well as understandings of democracy. Finally, it summarizes the 
study findings and raises its theoretical and political implications, discuss the 
findings and also offers some strategy (of social change) to support the process of 
democratization in Mozambique. 
 
 
The Importance of Popular Commitment to Democracy in 
Mozambique 
   
What we presently know about Africans’ commitment to democracy comes from a 
cross-national survey based analysis of one Francophone and eleven Anglophone 
sub-Saharan African countries. It finds that individual’s cognitive awareness 
(including whether or not people understand democracy as a system of political 
procedures rather than economic outcomes, as well as how much interest in and 
information about politics they possess) is the principal source when tested 
simultaneously against competing explanations based on social structure, cultural 
values, institutional influences and performance evaluations (Mattes and Bratton, 
2003; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). However, I examine popular 
commitment to democracy in the Lusophone African context of Mozambique.  
 
Mozambique may alter the existing findings because of the particular legacies that 
it inherited from Portuguese colonialism and the post independence civil war, 
especially its deleterious effects on formal education, news media and the 
availability of the independent, critical information necessary for democratic 
citizenship.  
 
Independent Mozambique inherited very low levels of literacy from its period of 
Portuguese colonialism.1 Colonialism granted only primary formal education to 
                                                 
1 After independence, due to Frelimo nationalization policy, most skilled Portuguese workers left 
the country leaving the public administration without qualified human capital. To keep 
government institutions functioning, the Frelimo government imported skilled workers from the 
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natives who could attend only Catholic Church schools, of which they were 
required to change their native name to a Portuguese one and convert to the 
Catholic religion in order to finish their qualifications. Only Europeans, Asians and 
a few assimilated2 natives could attend secondary and high schools. After 
independence in 1975, the literacy rate worsened as the country experienced 16 
years of brutal civil war (1977-1992) which destroyed the schooling infrastructure.3 
The literacy rate is now 46 percent.4  
 
In addition, Mozambique also inherited a very weak mass media network from the 
colonial period: one radio station (Rádio Moçambique), and two daily and one 
weekly newspapers.5 Though the country now has relative media pluralism, few 
people have access to print or televised media. Very few newspapers are distributed 
outside of provincial capital cities leaving many towns, boroughs and rural area 
without any print media access. The public television station created after the 
independence (1982) reached the country’s second biggest city, Beira, only in 
1994. It is now spread to provincial capital cities and few towns and boroughs, but 
no further. Rural areas do not have access to television. The lack of electricity also 
undermines internet access in these areas.  
 
But it is also important to replicate earlier studies in Mozambique because of the 
legacies of Frelimo’s communist style party-state system especially its control over 
society. To control the society, the party-state institutionalized at grass root levels a 
‘chief of ten households’ (chefe de dez casas) beyond ‘ward secretaries’ 
(Secretários de Bairros) and dynamical groups (grupos dinamizadores). It also 
                                                                                                                                                              
Soviet Union. Students with some secondary school but without teacher training were drafted to 
become teachers.  
2 Assimilated were those natives that were socialized in western culture. Most of them were sons 
of white fathers and black mothers. 
3 The existing school infrastructure was destroyed and all males 17 years and older had to do 
compulsory service in the army. By the end of 1980 the Renamo guerrillas controlled two-thirds 
of the country leaving the government confined to provincial capital cities. In these cities the few 
school vacancies were reserved only for successful students. Other students lost their vacancies in 
favor of young students or transferred to night schooling. The night schooling attempted to be 
more inclusive but it did not work due to constant electricity cuts in many capital cities. Some 
cities went two to four months without electricity. 
4 According to the Final Report on Household Survey published by the National Institute of 
Statistics, INE (2004), the average rate of illiteracy among adults nationwide is about 53.6%; it is 
higher in rural areas (65.7%) than in urban districts (30.3%) and more marked among women 
(68%) than men (37.7%). See also Mário and Nandja (2006). This household survey data is based 
on the period that the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in 2002. 
5 Diário de Moçambique and Notíciais are the two daily newspapers, and Domingo is the weekly. 
 4
nationalized all public and private institutions and organizations, including even 
barber and tailor shops.  
 
Under the party-state system, the state secret police closely monitored 
Mozambicans who listened to news from foreign broadcasts, like BBC (British 
Broadcasting Corporation), arguing that foreign influences would undermine the 
socialist project. Like in other communist countries, the circulation of information 
was controlled by party-state agencies.  
 
The Frelimo one-party system favored pro-government trade unions and business 
organizations. Indeed, it created a confederation of labor unions – Organização dos 
Trabalhadores Moçambicanos-Central Sindical (OTM-CS), which are still today 
aligned with the state. Business organizations in Mozambique were also strongly 
dominated by the state. In fact,  
 
‘the bureaucratic elite which grew in the shadow of the Frelimo party-
state are in the phase of re-conversion and installation into the world of 
business and the nascent national business class. For this, their main 
capital is precisely their link with Frelimo and its state. It is people in 
this stratum – including, for instance, the army officers from the army 
struggle – who have benefited most from the privatization of companies 
and services that were once under state control as well as bank credits 
granted with no expectation of repayment, or at nominal interest rates’ 
(Pereira and Shenga, 2005:56). 
 
On the other hand, church, or community development or self-help organizations 
were historically able to retain more independence from the state. 
 
The Frelimo party-state system also shaped the range of influential persons that 
citizens could contact to obtain help or communicate their concerns or needs. 
Besides the usual array of Frelimo party officials and officials of government 
ministry, traditional rulers, local councilors and other community influential 
persons have also been aligned to the state. Traditional rulers were described in 
Decree Number 15/2000, of June 20 as a continuation of the state bureaucracy at 
grass roots and community levels and assigned the task of collecting taxes. Frelimo 
local councilors have dominated all municipalities since they won the 1998 local 
elections. Other community influential persons, like those who are relatively 
wealthier, are also the bureaucratic elite which grew up in the shadow of Frelimo 
one-party system and is in the phase of re-conversation and installation in the world 
 5
of business and the nascent business class (Pereira and Shenga, 2005). Thus, few 
officials or community leaders remain totally outside state control.  
 
In this context, Mozambicans will not only tend to have low levels of information 
about politics, but they also should tend to get their information from state aligned 
sources.  How much Mozambican’s know about public affairs and politics as well 
as where they obtain their information is likely to shape how they understand 
democracy and their level of commitment to democracy. I distinguish between 
substantive understandings of democracy, which refer to what democracy does or 
its concrete outcomes, and procedural understandings, which emphasize the rules 
and procedures of democracy (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). The former 
“prescribes a specific content to policy” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) 
such as improving living standards or alleviation of poverty, whereas the later “is 
precisely about the struggle to determine those policies” (Diamond, 2005). How 
much Mozambican’s know about politics and where they get that information may 
also shape the bases on which they support democracy – whether it is based on 
performance evaluations of political factors (like delivery of freedoms and political 
rights) or of economic factors (such as the availability of jobs opportunities and 
improvement of living standards). Thus, I am interested in exploring the extent to 
which individual levels and sources of information shape Mozambicans’ 
understandings of democracy as well as their commitment to democracy, and also 
the bases of their commitment to democracy by using public opinion data.  
 
 
Hypotheses and Arguments 
 
I expect that the few Mozambicans with high levels of political information and 
who get their information from relatively independent sources will be more likely 
to understand democracy procedurally and also will be more likely to be committed 
to democracy, and will be more likely to base their commitment to democracy on 
political performance rather than economic performance factors. In contrast, the 
majority who have low levels of information and who acquire it from state aligned 
sources will be more likely to understand democracy substantively and will be less 
likely to be committed to democracy.  
 
The reasoning behind my expectations is as follows: “Education is a catalyst of 
social change; formal schooling informs people about the way things work in the 
world; and it increases awareness of public affairs” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-
Boadi, 2005:204). It is through education that individuals learn the rules of how the 
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society functions and receive knowledge to play out their role. It also helps them to 
navigate more easily in other cognitive arenas (Bertrand and Valois, 1994). For 
instance, acquiring and processing information from newspapers requires a degree 
of formal education. Mass media exposure enhances “civic consciousness” (Hyden, 
Leslie and Ogundimu, 2002:vii); and “prompts policy discussion” (Bratton, Mattes 
and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:219). Like education, media consumption is connected 
with cognitive skills.  
 
On the other hand, obtaining information from state aligned sources is not 
conducive to positive attitudes toward democracy since the quality of democracy in 
Mozambique is being subverted and constrained by those very Frelimo officials or 
elites who administer the state. While political reforms have led to some former 
autocracies being reclassified as ‘liberal democracies’ or at least ‘electoral 
democracies’, Mozambique’s political regime is at best ‘ambiguous’ (see Diamond, 
2002). Freedoms are limited and corruption is high (Transparency International, 
2005; Freedom House, 2005). Electoral institutions, including the constitutional 
council, are infiltrated by and favor the dominant party, thus reducing the level of 
political competition. Due the adoption of a highly presidentialized system, the 
legislature cannot hold the executive accountable, with limited oversight and 
representation responsibilities. Thus, obtaining political information from the very 
state aligned sources that subvert democracy means, at best, that people fail to 
receive any positive message of the procedural elements of democracy and become 
less committed democrats. In addition, given the Marxist route of Frelimo, it is 
likely that they will transmit substantive views of democracy.  
 
Relying on the information they have from their formal education and greater uses 
of private mass media as well as the use of more independent or critical sources of 
information, committed democrats compare the previous and current regimes in 
terms of the delivery of political rather than economic goods. They perceive that 
the basket of political goods has improved while inequality has increased.  
 
Indeed, though Mozambique has registed high levels of economic growth, since 
1998, it has not been equally redistributed across the country. Macroeconomic 
improvements (like economic growth and controlled inflation) have not been 
reflected at the micro level (in terms of the improvements of individual living 
standards). On the other hand, Mozambicans now enjoy freedoms and political 
rights that were denied or limited under the old regime.  
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Why is Popular Commitment to Democracy Important? 
 
Popular commitment to democracy (legitimation) is a multidimensional construct 
that combines the concepts of support for democracy and a broader rejection of 
authoritarian regimes. The popular legitimation of democracy is argued by many 
analysts to be the key to democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Rose, 
Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998; Diamond, 1999). 
 
Linz and Stepan (1996) stress that consolidation occurs when all political actors 
come to regard democracy as “the only game in town”, in other words, this means 
“democracy is consolidated when citizens and leaders alike conclude that no 
alternative form of regime has any greater subjective validity or stronger objective 
claim to their allegiance” (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:447).  
 
By examining and understanding post-communist societies, Rose, Mishler and 
Haerpfer (1998) highlight that popular support is the foundation to maintaining a 
political regime. Without support no political regime can survive, maintain or 
consolidate (Diamond, 1999). Similarly, Gunther, Montero and Torcal point out 
that “support for democracy may serve as the bedrock of democratic stability and 
an important ingredient for the functioning of a healthy democracy” (Gunther, 
Montero and Torcal, 2004:1; Gunther, Montero and Puhle, 2004). 
 
However, while Linz and Stepan (1996) measured commitment to democracy by 
‘preference (support) for democracy against its alternatives’; Rose, Mishler and 
Haerpfer (1998) measured it by ‘rejection of authoritarian regimes’. This study 
adopts both methods of measuring and explaining popular commitment to 
democracy, following Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) and Mattes and 
Shin (2005).  
 
 
The Likely Sources of Popular Commitment to Democracy 
 
 
Levels of information  
 
This explanation assumes that the amount of political and civic information that 
people possess matters for their attitudes to democracy. People with high levels of 
information – based on access to formal education and, or exposure to news media 
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– are expected to be more aware of public affairs and more supportive of 
democracy (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). News media consumption 
is said to increase awareness of democracy, enhance a “civic consciousness” 
(Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu, 2002), and “prompts policy discussion” (Bratton, 
Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Exposure to mass media also becomes a decisive 
factor for democratisation by not only informing people about political events and 
public affairs, but also enabling them to become watchdogs of the democratic 
political process (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 2004:2-4).  
 
However, this does not mean that citizens who lack education access and media 
exposure necessarily lack the information to form attitudes toward democracy. 
Individuals not only acquire information through formal education and news media, 
but can also learn from others, where individuals add their personal experiences to 
that of others (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). Thus, acquiring information from 
alternative sources still matters for democratic consolidation. 
 
People may acquire political information and develop interest in public affairs from 
their interpersonal social networks, through the ‘active discussion of politics with 
friends and neighbors, spouse and co-workers’ (Richardson and Beck, 2004). 
Discussion of politics with family members, co-workers, and friends was found to 
be more influential than media (e.g. newspapers) by Lazarsfeld and colleagues for 
two reasons: first, interpersonal networks have greater coverage and second, are 
based on high levels of trust among network members (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and 
Gaudet, 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee, 1954). I discuss this set of 
psychological orientations under the label of “cognitive engagement” (Bratton, 
Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). 
 
 
Sources of Information 
 
Some scholars argue that the specific informational environment in which people 
obtain their information has an important effect on political attitudes that can be 
conducive to democratic consolidation. Gunther, Montero and Torcal, for example, 
focus on the nature of information intermediation in a wide variety of democratic 
systems, and the implication of different patterns of intermediation for the nature of 
politics and the quality of democracy (Gunther, Montero and Torcal, 2004). 
Gunther, Montero and Torcal (2004) distinguish between informational 
intermediaries that are ‘explicitly political’ from those that are ‘ostensibly apolitical 
and non-partisan’. 
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However, I distinguish mainly between sources of information that are state aligned 
from those that are relatively more independent. I argue that obtaining information 
from sources that are state controlled or state aligned has a different impact on 
attitudes to democracy compared to obtaining it from sources that are more 
independent or non-state aligned.  
 
Nevertheless, the nature and extent of this impact from country to country depends 
on the degree to which ruling party and government officials are managing the state 
toward or away from democratization. If they are in the process of subverting the 
quality of democracy, people who contact them or are members of their 
organizations are more likely to get information that is detrimental to democracy.6  
 
Alternatively contacting influential persons that are far away from state control or 
are more independent is likely to create more positive attitudes to democracy. They 
are more likely to be critical about the conduct of government in office and more 
likely to demand shared power across state institutions, accountability, competition, 





The performance evaluation explanation is based on a rational choice approach to 
individual political behavior. It assumes that political actors make rational 
decisions in situations of uncertainty. They “make choices within constraints to 
obtain their desired ends (self-interests)” (Levi, 1997:27). Individuals evaluate the 
performance of officials, regimes, governments and institutions on the basis of 
practical tests of how that performance affects personal and collective self-interests 
(Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).  
 
Improving democratic performance is widely cited as a prerequisite for democratic 
(legitimation) consolidation. However, researchers differ by the relative emphasis 
                                                 
6 Fung (2003) points out that associational life, for instance, can enhance democracy by fostering 
civic virtues and teaching political skills, offering resistance to power and checking government, 
improving the quality and equality of representation, facilitating public deliberation, and creating 
opportunities for citizens and groups to participate directly in governance. However, Fung also 
points out that this contribution depends on the nature of associations and on the political context 
of a given society. Some forms of associations are better suited and advanced than others.  
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they place on the importance of economic and political performance factors (Evans 
and Whitefield, 1995).  
 
Some scholars, the so-called ‘first generation’, highlight the effectiveness of 
government delivery of socio-economic goods as the key to the sustainability of 
democracy (Przerworski, 1991, Elster, 1993; Ake, 1996; Pereira, Maraval & 
Przerworski, 1993; Przerworski et al., 1996), indicating that democratic regimes 
that do a better job handling the economy and improving people’s living standards 
are more likely to endure (Przerworski et al., 1996). As such, the transition to 
democracy is a function of the degree to which economic experience departs from 
citizens expectations (Przerworski, 1991:184). 
 
Elster (1993) argues that democracy will be undermined if it cannot deliver goods 
in the economic sphere (Elster, 1993: 268). In the same line of thinking, Ake 
(1996) argues that Africans view democracy in economic and instrumental terms. 
Contending that “Africans are seeking democracy as a matter of survival” he posits 
that “the democratic movement in Africa will emphasize concrete economic and 
social rights rather than abstract political rights; it will insist on the democratisation 
of economic opportunities, the social betterment of people, and a strong social 
welfare system” (Ake, 1996: 239-44).  
 
On the other side, ‘second generation’ researchers emphasize “the ability of 
citizens to exercise basic political rights” (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:451) and 
“expectation(s) of public order, accountability, freedom, and constitutionalism” 
(Diamond, 1997) as the prerequisite to the durability of democracy.  
 
In fact, most empirical studies have found that popular support for democracy is 
largely based on political considerations rather than economic. As Diamond points 
out: “The most striking finding is the autonomy of the political”, which overpowers 
“the country’s level of socio economic development, the individual’s socio 
economic status, and the regime’s economic performance” (Diamond, 1999:162). 
Similarly, Rose, Mishler and Haepfer contend that public opinion about various 
political regimes is shaped more by guarantees of basic political rights than by a 
track record of material delivery” (Rose, Mishler and Haepfer, 1998:160). They 
find that while economic factors contribute to legitimation, politics matters more. 
Moreover, Evans and Whitefield (1995) also found that both economic and 
political performance are important but the multiple effects suggests that the 
perceived political performance is of greater weight than is economic since it 
appears to have considerably stronger effects. 
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The Scope and Design of this Study 
 
I test the effects of these explanatory factors on citizens’ commitment to democracy 
using a micro-level analysis, and a cross-sectional design, which means “people of 
many ages, behaviors, and opinions are represented within the study population” 
(Lewis-Beck, Bryaman and Liao, 2004:299-230). This study is based on public 
opinion sample survey data from Round 2 of the Afrobarometer.7 This survey 
interviewed a sample of 1400 Mozambicans that was a randomly selected 
representative sample of the adult Mozambican population between August and 
October 2002 in all 10 provinces of the Republic of Mozambique plus Maputo City 
through face-to-face interviews. Hypotheses’ testing is conducted through multiple 
linear regression analysis.  
 
 
2. Attitudes toward Democracy in Mozambique: 
Commitment to and Understandings of Democracy 
 
This section introduces and provides descriptive features of Mozambicans’ 
understandings of democracy and their levels of commitment to democracy. What 
are Mozambicans levels of commitment to democracy? How do Mozambicans 
regard, view or understand democracy: are they more likely to understand 
democracy procedurally or substantively?  
   
 
2.1. Commitment to Democracy 
 
Popular commitment to democracy (or legitimation) is a multidimensional 
construct that combines the constituent concepts of popular support for democracy 
and a broader rejection of authoritarian regimes. Committed democrats are those 
people who simultaneously support democracy (i.e. say ‘democracy is preferable to 
any other kind of government’) and strongly reject any type of authoritarian 
regimes, like one-party, military, and one-man rule (see Bratton, Mattes and 
Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mattes and Shin, 2005).  
 
                                                 
7 Available online: www.afrobarometer.org 
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To describe the patterns of Mozambicans levels of commitment to democracy I 
examine first their levels of support for democracy and then their rejection of three 
forms of authoritarian regimes.    
 
 
Support for democracy 
 
Support for democracy is a popular preference for democratic political regime 
against its alternatives. People who support democracy say they prefer it to any 
other kind of government. Figure 2.1 summarizes the results of a 2002 random 
representative sample of 18 years and older Mozambican population. The results 
show a moderate level of popular support for democracy among Mozambicans. Just 
over one half (54 percent) of respondents say that democracy is preferable to any 
other kind of government. 
 




Question: “Which of the following statements is closest to your opinion? A) 
Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; B) In some circumstances, 
a non-democratic government can be preferable; and C) for someone like me it does 
not matter what form of government we have”.  
  
In comparison to results of Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 16 
countries between 2002 and 2003,8 Mozambicans support for democracy is about 
                                                 
8 In Zimbabwe, the Round 2 Afrobarometer survey was implemented in 2004 due political 
instability. 
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10 percentage points lower than the 16 country average (64 percent). Among 16 
Afrobarometer countries in Round 2, Kenya present the highest (80 percent) level 
followed by Senegal (75 percent), Uganda (75 percent), Mali (71 percent), Zambia 
(70 percent), Nigeria (67 percent), Botswana (66 percent), Tanzania and Cape 
Verde (65 percent), Malawi (64 percent) and South Africa (57 percent). And then 
follows Mozambique and Namibia, both with 54 percent of popular support for 
democracy. The lowest level of popular support for democracy in Round 2 of the 
Afrobarometer survey comes from Zimbabwe (48 percent) and Lesotho (50 
percent).  
 





Rejection of authoritarian regimes 
 
I also examine the patterns of rejection of other regimes that have been 
experimented with in the African context, especially authoritarian ones. Rejection 
of authoritarian regimes refers to a popular disapproval of three types of 
authoritarian regimes, namely: one-party, one-man, and military rule. What are the 
levels of Mozambicans’ rejection of those three forms of authoritarian regimes? 
 14
Figure 2.3 show the distributions of respondents in categories of rejections of the 
three forms of authoritarian regimes. The results show that just less than half (47 
percent and 46 percent) of all respondents, respectively, reject one-party rule and 
one-man rule.  
 
However, military government appears to be rejected at slightly higher levels. More 
than half (56 percent) of respondents strongly reject or reject military rule, 
suggesting that after 16 years of experience of the long and destructive civil war 
Mozambicans are less likely to tolerate the army coming in to govern the country, 
than a reversal to one-party rule or ‘strong man’ rule.  
 




Question: “There are many ways of governing a country. Would you reject or 
approve of the following alternatives? Only one party is allowed to stand for election 
and hold office (one-party rule); the army comes in to govern the country (military 
rule); and elections and the national assembly are abolished so that the president can 
decide everything (one-man rule)”. 
 
These levels of rejection of authoritarian regimes in Mozambique are the lowest in 
Africa.9 While Mozambique and Namibia have the lowest proportions of 
disapproval of one-party, one-man and military rule, Zambia and Kenya have the 
highest levels. Zambians lead the way in rejecting military rule; Ugandans share the 
lead in rejecting one-man rule and Nigerians are most dismissive of one-party rule 
(see Figures 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3).  
                                                 
9 When I speak about Africa, it means those 16 Afrobarometer countries. 
 15
 
In general, the average proportions of these considerations in Africa indicate that 
large majorities of Africans reject authoritarian regimes. Indeed, the average of 
disapproval of military rule is 78 percent among Africans, while of one-man and 
one-party rule is respectively 77 percent and 68 percent. 
 
This low level of popular commitment to democracy (e.g. support for democracy 
and rejection of authoritarian regimes) in Mozambique reflects low levels of elite 
commitment to democracy. While Mozambique’s political elite agreed on the rules 
for competing for power, they have not yet agreed on ways to enforce limits on 
state authority. All electoral institutions, including the constitutional council, are 
controlled by the ruling party reducing the scope of political competition and 
participation. The entire state authority rests on the president who is both head of 
state and of government, and the parliament cannot hold the head of government 
accountable since the constitution allows him to delegate the premier whenever he 
wants. 
 












Commitment to democracy composite index 
 
Following previous studies of popular commitment to democracy in Africa 
(Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mattes and Shin, 2005), I have defined 
commitment to democracy as a popular preference of democracy against its 
alternatives and a broader rejection of authoritarianism. However, to make sure that 
this construct is both valid and reliable I tested it statistically using factor and 
reliability analyses.10 Factor analysis confirms validity, and the reliability analysis 
confirms internal consistency, that Mozambicans’ preference of democracy is 
strongly related to their rejection of three forms of authoritarian regimes. In other 
words, we can confidently say that committed democrats are those Mozambicans 
who say democracy is preferable to any other form of government, and who 
strongly reject one-party, military and one-man governments. A single unrotated 
factor was extracted with an eigenvalue greater that one (1.521) which explains 51 
percent of the common variance. The index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) is (.65) 
acceptable.  Thus, instead of using popular support for democracy and rejection of 
the three forms of authoritarian regimes as they were separate attitudes I employ its 
composite index in further analyses as my main dependent variable.  
 
Table 2.1: Commitment to democracy (index) 
 
 Factor loadings 
Reject military rule .709 
Reject one-man rule .776 
Reject one-party rule .593 
Support for democracy .252 
 
Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.521, and common variance 
of 51 percent.  Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha =.65.  Number of cases (n=1385). 
 
 
                                                 
10 It is to be seen here that committed democrats are only those who strongly reject authoritarian 
regime. Those who simply reject are partially committed democrats. As such, they are not coded 
with highest value to compute index of commitment to democracy. 
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2.2. Procedural versus Substantive Understandings of 
Democracy 
 
Understandings of democracy refer to the ways that individual views or regard 
democracy. We distinguish between procedural and substantive understandings of 
democracy. Substantive understandings of democracy refer to what democracy 
does in terms of concrete outcomes. It “subscribes a specific content to policy” 
(Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005), like improvement of people living 
standards or alleviation of poverty. Procedural understandings are “precisely about 
the struggle to determine those policies” (Diamond, 2005). They emphasize 
“political process for arriving at decisions” and “includes guarantees of civil rights 
and rules for elections, under which uncertain police outcomes arise from interplay 
of contending political forces” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:69). In 
short, it refers to what democracy is or ‘as an end in itself’ rather than what it does. 
 
Is democracy understood procedurally or substantively in Mozambique? The 
measure used in this study differs from the one presented in Bratton, Mattes and 
Gyimah-Boadi (2005). While Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) measure 
understandings of democracy by an open-ended question: “What, if anything, does 
‘democracy’ mean to you?” encouraging respondents to answer in their own words, 
through a scale of 8 items: 4 procedural and 4 substantive, using Round 1 of the 
Afrobarometer data, I use Round 2 of the Afrobarometer one, which asks about this 
issue in a very different manner.11  
 
Round 2 of the Afrobarometer asks a question that provides respondents with two 
statements: (1) ‘democracy is worth having because it allows everyone a free and 
equal voice in making decisions’; or (2) ‘democracy is only worth having if it can 
address everyone’s basics needs’.  
 
The evidence in Table 2.5 shows that most (61 percent) Mozambicans understand 
democracy as a set of procedures for arriving at decisions (i.e. ‘democracy is worth 
having because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’). 
Just under one-fifth (21 percent) of Mozambicans view it substantively (i.e. 
‘democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone’s basic needs’). Yet 
while 32 percent of Frelimo identifiers can understand democracy procedurally, 31 
                                                 
11 While my procedural measure only taps the aspect of ‘equal and free voice in making 
decisions’, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) procedural measure taps a range of liberal 
procedures of democracy. 
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percent of independent citizens (those who identify with no political party) and 
even lower 23 percent of opposition identifies do so.   
 




Question: “Which of the following statement is closest to your view? Statement A 
or statement B? Statement A: Democracy is worth having because it allows 
everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions. Statement B: Democracy is 
only worth having if it can address everyone’s basics needs”. 
 
When compared to results of Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys in 16 countries, 
Mozambicans’ procedural understanding of democracy is about 11 percentage 
points higher than the 16 country average (50 percent). While Cape Verdeans (69 
percent) and Tanzanians (62 percent) lead the way in understanding democracy ‘as 
a means that allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’, Basotho 
(30 percent), Zimbabweans (30 percent), Malians (37 percent), Senegalese (37 
percent), Batswana (39 percent) and even Ghaneans (44 percent) are less likely to 
do so (Figure 2.6).  
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Figure 2.6: Understandings of democracy in 16 Afrobarometer countries 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
That Mozambicans understand democracy as ‘an end in itself’ might reflect the role 
played by the enormous information network of voter education campaigns mainly 
in the 1994 founding elections involving “almost all the country broadcasting, 
video and advertisement companies, dozens of related institutions, and thousands 
of young Mozambicans” (de Maia, 1996). Though the aim of this campaign was “to 
mobilize the public, first to register as voters, and then for the actual voting itself” 
(de Maia, 1996:151), the voter education agents first had to explain the meaning of 
the concept of democracy, that is, what democracy is. This may also reflect the 
long history of conflict and violence that Mozambicans see procedures as a form of 
conflict resolution. Supporting this, for instance, is the fact that countries that 
experienced long conflict’s periods and violence, like Nigeria, Namibia and 
Uganda, and are also quite high on procedural understanding (see Figure 2.6).    
 
Instead of simply describing the features of these attitudes toward Mozambicans 
understandings of and commitment to democracy I am also interested in explaining 
them. This is the goal of the sections that follows where I will test and examine the 
effects of levels and sources of information considerations on Mozambicans 
understandings of, and commitment to, democracy.  
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3. The Effects of Levels and Sources of 
Information on Mozambicans’ Understandings of 
and Commitment to Democracy 
 
In this section, I test and examine the joint impacts of levels and sources of 
information, and cognitive engagement factors on public understandings of and 
commitment to democracy, using multivariate analysis.  
 
Table 3.1 presents a multiple linear regression model that separately tests the 
impacts of levels and sources of information on two attitudes to democracy, 
understandings of democracy and commitment to democracy. The first and second 
column under each dependent variable contains the standardized regression 
coefficients (Beta). The levels of significance are in parentheses. I have highlighted 
all effects that are statistically significant, which indicates that the null hypothesis 
(which states that there is no relationship between the two variables) can be 
rejected.  
 
The negative or positive sign in each coefficient indicates the direction of the 
relationship. Non-significant effects mean that the two variables are not at all 
connected. In the lasts rows I present the sample size (n) and the total explained 
variance (Adjusted R Square) of the model on each dependent variable.  
 
The evidence shows that Mozambicans who identify with political opposition or 
with the ruling party, belong to religious groups, and who are interested in public 
affairs are more likely to understand democracy as a set of procedures that ‘allows 
everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’, with the effect of partisan 
identification with political opposition weighing more. On other hand, those who 
have access to news media, belong to trade unions or farm associations are less 
likely to understand democracy procedurally. In other words, they are more likely 
to understand democracy substantively (e.g. ‘democracy is only worth having if it 
can address everyone’s basic needs’). However, the overall ‘informational’ model 
has only limited power, explaining only 2 percent of the total variance in 
understandings of democracy. 
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Table 3.1: The effects of levels and sources of information and cognitive 







(Constant) (.000) (.047) 
Levels of information   
Media usage -.082(.018) .198(.000) 
Formal education .043(.223) .127(.000) 
   
Cognitive engagement   
Interpersonal discussion of politics .031(.377) .116(.000) 
Interest in public affairs .063(.031) -.031(.250) 
   
Independent sources of information   
Membership in religious groups .056(.049) .055 (.036) 
Membership in community development 
associations 
-.007(.827) .014 (.632) 
Contacting religious leaders -.016(.630) .074 (.017) 
Collective action .021(.538) .073(.017) 
Identification with opposition parties .157(.015) .105(.073) 
   
State aligned sources of information   
Membership in trade unions -.068(.024) -.052 (.060) 
Membership in business groups -.053(.091) -.018 (.538) 
Contacting local councilors .006(.852) -.025(.381) 
Contacting officials of government ministries .023(.457) .065(.023) 
Contacting traditional rulers -.012(.728) -.102 (.001) 
Contacting other community influentials -.020(.529) -.008(.769) 
Identification with the ruling party .156(.015) .048(.413) 
n 1400 1400 
Adjusted R Square .015 .183 
 
Note: The table shows standardized beta coefficients. Levels of significance are in parentheses. 




With respect to sources of information, the effects of identification with opposition 
parties, membership in religious groups and in trade unions or farm associations are 
consistent with my hypothesis, since their effects are statistically significant and 
with the right sign. The effects of participation in collective action, membership in 
business organizations, and contacting traditional rulers and other community 
influential persons are also consistent with my hypothesis since their effects have 
the right sign though they are statistically insignificant. Among those effects that 
are statistically significant but with the opposite sign is the effect of identification 
with the ruling party, which is inconsistent with my hypothesis. In addition, among 
those effects that are statistically insignificant but with opposite sign is the impacts 
of membership in community development associations and contacting religious 
leaders, local councilors and government officials, which are also inconsistent with 
my propositions. 
 
Turning to the second column, the results show that popular commitment to 
democracy in Mozambique is propelled by news media use, access to formal 
education, interpersonal discussion of politics, contacting religious leaders and 
officials of government ministries, and membership in religious groups. However, 
the consumption of news media has the greatest impact. On the other hand, 
contacting traditional rulers detracts from commitment to democracy.  
 
Informational factors are able to account for more variance in commitment to 
democracy than understandings of democracy. Overall, this informational model 
accounts for roughly 18 percent of total explained variance in commitment to 
democracy. 
 
With regard to sources of information, the impacts of membership in religious 
groups, contacting religious leaders and traditional rulers and participation in 
collective action are consistent with my hypothesis, since their impacts have the 
right sign and are statistically significant. The impact of membership in community 
development organizations, business groups and trade unions, contacting local 
councilors and other community influential persons, and identification with the 
opposition parties are also consistent with my propositions, but their impacts are 
statistically insignificant. While the effect of contacting government officials is 
inconsistent with my hypothesis, since its effect has the opposite sign and is 
statistically significant, the effect of identification with the ruling party is 




4. The Basis of Mozambicans’ Commitment to 
Democracy 
 
Beyond the impact of levels and sources of information I ask whether people base 
their commitment to democracy on economic or political performance evaluations. 
I also ask whether the impacts of levels and sources of information remain once we 
consider effects of performance evaluations and understandings of democracy.  
 
All the potential influences on popular commitment to democracy so far considered 
in the past chapters were included in a multivariate linear regression analysis. 
Model 1 in Table 4.2 reflects the effects of economic performance evaluations 
factors on popular commitment to democracy, while Model 2 represents the models 
of political evaluations.  
 
Analyzing these two models we observe both economic (.109) and political (.110) 
models account for roughly equal levels of explained variance in commitment to 
democracy. However, political models account for slightly more variance than 
economic ones.  
 
Model 3 shows the joint effects of economic and political evaluations factors on 
popular commitment to democracy. The results show that, with the exception of 
prospective economic evaluations, all economic and political indicators contribute 
significantly to commitment to democracy. Government handling economy, 
delivery of political rights, perceived official corruption, safety from crime or 
violence, and evaluations of economic reform have greater impact on commitment 
to democracy than present, relative and retrospective economic evaluations and 
performance of political incumbents. However, the impacts of government 
handling economy, safety from crime or violence and present and relative 
economic evaluations are negative.  
 
These findings suggest the following: Mozambicans who think their government is 
handling the economy well are less likely to be committed to democracy, while 
those who perceive an improved delivery of political rights (including freedom to 
say what they think, to join any political organization, to choose who to vote for 
without feeling pressured, freedom from false arrest, and the ability to influence 
government) are more likely to be committed to democracy.  
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Mozambicans who perceive improvements in safety from crime or violence under 
the current multiparty system are less likely to be committed democrats. As argued 
earlier, this suggests that Mozambicans do not see their own personal safety as part 
of that same basket. In fact, it even suggests that those who feel safer now than 
under the old regime do not credit that safety to the advent of democracy. Those 
who perceive official corruption are more likely to be committed democrats in 
Mozambique. They demand decent and clean government, transparency and ethics 
in governance as well as respect for democratic procedures.  
 
While Mozambicans who perceive economic reform, performance of political 
incumbents and retrospective economic evaluations positively are much likely to 
develop democratic commitments, those who perceive that their present and 
relative economic conditions improved are less likely to be committed democrats.   
 
Overall, to what extent are public orientations to democracy formed by economic 
and political performance evaluations? The Adjusted R Square shows that 
economic and political factors explain 18 percent of the variation in commitment to 
democracy. This suggests an important impact with virtually no difference in the 
explanatory impact of political versus economic factors.  
 
Model 4 drops the indicators which are statistically insignificant in order to 
estimate a more accurate Adjusted R Square and develop a more parsimonious 
model (Kerry, Hall and Kozub, 2002). The results show that with the exception of 
retrospective and relative economic evaluations, all economic and political 
considerations maintain the same ranking order and sign. Relative economic 
evaluations which ranked ahead retrospective economic evaluations under the 
previous Model 3, now rank behind retrospective economic evaluations under 
Model 4. When I drop statistically insignificant effects (prospective economic 
evaluations) from the analysis, Model 4 accounts for 17 percent of explained 
variance in commitment to democracy.    
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Table 4.2: The effects of performance evaluations on commitment to democracy (multivariate linear 
regression)  
 









(Constant) (.352) (.000) (.001) (.000)   
       
Economic evaluations       
Evaluations of economic 
reform 
.199(.000)  .136 (.000) .141 (.000)   
Government handling economy -.260 (.000)  -.219 (.000) -.216 (000)   
Present economic evaluations -.105 (.000)  -.083 (.003) -.077 (.006)   
Relative economic evaluations -.103 (.001)  -.085 (.004) -.080 (.006)   
Retrospective econ. evaluations .094 (.002)  .085 (.004) .101 (000)   
Prospective econ. evaluations .065 (.034)  .047 (.111) -   
     .106 .106 
Political evaluations       
Delivery of political rights  .220 (.000) .179 (.000) .182 (.000)   
Perceived official corruption  .153 (.000) .144 (.000) .146 (.000)   
Perform. of political 
incumbents 
 .039 (.137) .052 (.047) .054 (.038)   
Safety from crime or violence  -.231 (.000) -.161 (.000) -.159 (.000)   
     .110 .174 
N 1400 1400 1400 1400   
Adjusted R Square .109 .110 .175 .174   
 
Note: Table shows standardized beta coefficients. Levels of significance are in parentheses. Significant effects are highlighted in bold. 
 
 27
To finalize, I find that economic and political performance evaluation 
considerations do matter to the development of individual democratic 
commitments. In contrast to the great bulk of the public opinion literature, I find no 
evidence for the primacy of the political: in Mozambique both politics and 
economics contribute equally to democratic commitment.  
 
Do the impacts of economic and political performance evaluations remain even 
after we take cognitive influences into consideration in the analysis? This is the 
question that I answer in the section that follows. 
 
 
Adding cognitive factors 
 
Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.3 show the effect of adding cognitive considerations 
(levels and sources of information, cognitive engagement and understandings of 
democracy) to our multivariate account of commitment to democracy. While 
Model 1 shows the effects of all cognitive and performance evaluation indicators, 
Model 2 drops all statistically insignificant indicators to obtain a more accurate 
estimate of Adjusted R Square and a more parsimonious model.  
 
The evidence shows that even after accounting for economic and political 
performance evaluations, we continue to observe that Mozambicans with high 
levels of information (from news media use and access to formal education), who 
discuss politics with friends or neighbors, and who obtain their information from 
relatively more independent sources (like participation in collective action and 
contacting religious leaders) are more likely to be committed to democracy than 
those who obtain their information from state aligned sources (particularly 
contacting traditional rulers) (Model 1 in Table 4.3). However, those Mozambicans 
who are interested in public affairs are less likely to be committed democrats.  
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Table 4.3: The effects of performance evaluations and cognition on 
commitment to democracy (multivariate linear regression)  
 
Model 2  Model 1 




(Constant) (.265)    
Economic evaluations     
Evaluations of economic reform .098 (.000) .110 (000)   
Government handling economy -.209 (000) -.219 (000)   
Present economic evaluations -.033 (.241) -   
Relative economic evaluations -.039 (.179) -   
Retrospective econ. evaluations .057 (.055) -   
Prospective economic evaluations .017 (582) -   
   .086 .085 
Political evaluations     
Delivery of political rights .115 (.000) .122 (000)   
Perceived official corruption .094 (.000) .081 (001)   
Perform. of political incumbents .015 (.585) -   
Safety from crime or violence -.068 (.013) -.086 (.001)   
   .111 .156 
Levels of information     
Media usage .168 (.000) .173 (000)   
Formal education .068 (.031) .088 (.000)   
     
Cognitive engagement   .138 .226 
Interpersonal discussion of politics .093 (.003) .103 (.001)   
Interest in public affairs -.054 (.040) -.050 (.044)   
   .067 .241 
Independent sources of information    
Membership in religious groups .020 (.442) -   
Memb. in community. devel. 
assoc. 
.022 (.434) -   
Contacting religious leaders .065 (.031) .071 (.010)   
Collective action .075 (.012) .066 (.020)   
Identification w/ opposition 
parties 
.081 (.153) -   
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Model 2  Model 1 




   .035 .244 
State aligned sources of information    
Membership in trade unions -.039 (.147) -   
Membership in business groups .002 (.956) -   
Contacting local councilors -.039 (147) -   
Contacting government officials .049 (.089) -   
Contacting traditional ruler -.094 (.004) -.093 (.001)   
Cont. other community 
influentials 
-.001 (.962) -   
Identification with the ruling party .004 (.434) -   
   .012 .249 
Procedural unders. of 
democracy 
.073 (.004) .079 (.001)   
   .015 .255 
Adjusted R Square .257 .255   
Note: Table shows standardized beta coefficients. Levels of significance are in parentheses. 
Significant effects are highlighted in bold (n=1400). 
 
 
Lastly the evidence shows that understanding democracy as a set of procedures that 
‘allows everyone an equal and free voice in making decisions’ or ‘as an end in 
itself’ matter positively for popular commitment to democracy, compared to seeing 
it ‘as a means to other ends’, like socio-economic development. In fact, the more 
people understand, view or regard democracy procedurally, the more they become 
committed to democracy.  
 
Taken together, political and economic performance evaluations and cognitive 
factors explain 26 percent of variance in public commitment to democracy. This 
explained variance drops very little when statistically insignificant effects are 
removed in Model 2. In fact, most of the statistically significant effects increase 
when irrelevant effects are removed from the analysis. Government handling 
economy ranks ahead of all other indicators, suggesting the greatest impact. Media 
use ranks behind government handling economy followed by delivery of political 
rights, evaluations of economic reform and interpersonal discussion of politics. 
Contacting traditional rulers, ranks behind interpersonal discussion of politics 
followed by formal education, safety from crime, perceived official corruption, 
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procedural understandings of democracy, contacting religious leaders, participation 
in collective action and interest in public affairs.   
 
To what extent does each theoretical family explain public commitment to 
democracy? Weighing the explanatory power of each model in the analysis, the 
results suggest that Mozambicans’ commitment to democracy is principally 
explained by levels of information from news media use and formal education, 
followed by political performance evaluations (delivery of political rights, official 
corruption and safety from crime). I now find moderate consistency with the 
literature that although economic performance factors contribute to the legitimacy 
of democracy, political performance factors matter more. While economic 
performance and cognitive engagement factors explain commitment to democracy 
moderately, obtaining information from state aligned and relatively more 
independent sources and understandings of democracy have weaker, though 





Based on a micro-level analysis of a cross-sectional design randomly selected 
representative sample survey of 1400 adult Mozambican population from Round 2 
of the Afrobarometer, conducted through face-to-face interview in August and 
October 2002, I tested and examined the effects of cognition and performance 
evaluation factors on Mozambicans commitment to democracy.  
 
My main findings are as follows. First, levels of information are the main source of 
popular commitment to democracy when taken into account simultaneously with 
competing explanations based on economic performance evaluations, cognitive 
engagement, relatively more independent versus state aligned sources of 
information and understandings of democracy. Second, both evaluations of 
economic and political performance matter for Mozambicans’ commitment to 
democracy. Third, the effects of political performance matter more than economics. 
Fourth, people who have high levels of information (from news media use and 
formal education), discuss politics with friends or neighbors and obtain their 
information from more independent sources (such as participation in collective 
action and contacting religious leaders) are more likely to be committed democrats. 
Fifth, procedural understandings of democracy are positively relevant for 
individual commitment to democracy.  
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This study also makes clear that ordinary Mozambicans are less committed to 
democracy than many other Africans from 16 Afrobarometer countries observed 
between 2002 and 2004. We observed moderate levels of support for democracy 
(54 percent) and rejection of military rule (56 percent), and weak rejection of one-
party (46 percent) and one-man rule (47 percent). These low levels of mass public 
commitment to democracy reflect low levels of elite commitments to democracy. 
While the Mozambican political elite agree on the rules for competing for power 
they do not yet enforce limits on state authority. In fact, all electoral institutions, 
including the Constitutional Council judiciary, are controlled by the ruling party 
reducing the scope of political competition and participation. The entire state 
authority rests on the president who is both head of state and of government, and 
the parliament cannot hold the head of government accountable since the 
constitution allows him to appoint or fire the premier whenever he wants. The 
political implications of these low levels of commitment to democracy at both the 
elite and mass levels means that democracy will be less likely to survive and 
consolidate (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1997; Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998; 
Diamond, 1999) in Mozambique.  
 
Nevertheless, the data suggests that Mozambicans understand democracy 
procedurally - e.g. as a set of procedures that ‘allows everyone a free and equal 
voice in making decisions’ (61 percent). The concept of democracy described by 
Mozambicans is both liberal and participatory, however this measure only taps the 
single aspect of ‘free and equal voice in making decisions’ but not a full range of 
liberal procedures, meaning that further analysis needs to includes more 
comprehensive measures of liberal procedures (including those to guarantee civil 
liberties and political rights, equality and justice, popular participation, peace and 
unity). It should be seen, however, that popular understandings of democracy in 
liberal and procedural terms are, by themselves, not sufficient to qualify the 
country regime as a ‘liberal democracy’. As classified by Diamond (2002), 
Mozambique is at its best an ‘ambiguous’ regime. As we saw, legitimacy is shallow 
and institutions are weak. Democratic procedures are frequently subverted, civil 
liberties abused, and elections in some cases are fraudulent and result in violence, 
especially the 1999 national and 2005 local elections in Montepuez and Mocímboa 
da Praia.  
 
In comparison to the rest of the 16 Afrobarometer countries, Mozambicans’ 
procedural understandings of democracy rank ahead Southern African countries 
and in sub-Saharan African countries, rank behind Cape Verdeans and Tanzanians. 
These relatively high levels of procedural understandings of democracy may reflect 
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the role played by an enormous information network of voter education campaigns 
mainly in the 1994 founding elections involving “almost all the country 
broadcasting, video and advertisement companies, dozens of related institutions, 
and thousands of young Mozambicans” (de Maia, 1996). This campaign was “to 
mobilize the public, first to register as voters, and then for the actual voting itself” 
(de Maia, 1996:151), but voter education agents first had to explain the meaning of 
the concept of democracy. These relatively high levels of procedural 
understandings of democracy may also reflect the long history of conflict and 
violence that Mozambicans see procedures as a form of conflict resolution.  
 
Finally, I square these high levels of procedural understandings of democracy with 
lower levels of actual commitment to democracy by the limited range that the 
measure of procedural understandings of democracy taps, using Round 2 
Afrobarometer survey. If I was able to include a full or range of liberal procedures 
in the measure of understandings of democracy, I believe that the procedural 






Casting light on the influences of levels of information, legitimacy of democracy is 
significantly and positively propelled by high levels of news media use and of 
formal education. “Formal education is a catalyst of social change” (Bratton, 
Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) and news media use prompt policy discussion 
and enhances “civic consciousness” (Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu, 2002). 
 
Reflecting the influences of ‘first generation’ scholars (Przerworski, 1991; Pereira, 
Maraval and Przerworski, 1993; Elster, 1993; Ake, 1996: Przerworski et al., 1996), 
the study of consolidation of democracy has been dominated by accounts based on 
the necessity of the democratic regime, and of incumbents and governments to 
produce positive economic performance. In contrast, weighing the explanatory 
power of performance models, I find that political performance matters more than 
economic explanations, and come next after levels of information in the ranking 
order of explaining political legitimacy. In addition, while economic performance 
of the government matters, the direction of this impact is negative. On other hand, 
positive performance in delivery of political rights contributes significantly and 
positively to democratic commitment. This confirms the ‘second generation’ 
researchers (Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Diamond, 1997; Rose, Mishler and 
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Haepfer, 1998; Bratton and Mattes, 2001) who have focused on the role of political 
performance factors, suggesting that “how democratic governments meet 
expectations for public order, accountability, freedom, and constitutionalism may 
be no less important, or even more so” (Diamond, 1997).  
 
Safety from crime or violence, official corruption, evaluations of economic reform, 
retrospective, relative and present economic evaluations and performance of 
political incumbents also contribute significantly to support for democracy. 
However, the impacts of safety from crime, and present and relative economic 
evaluations are negative. The effects of present and relative economic evaluations 
reconfirm that producing positive economic reform is not a requirement of 
democratic consolidation. Inconsistent with this theory is the positive effect of 
evaluations of economic reform and retrospective economic evaluations, which 
support to lesser extent ‘first generation’ scholars (Przerworski, 1991; Pereira, 
Maraval and Przerworski, 1993; Elster, 1993; Ake, 1996; Przerworski et al., 1996). 
The negative effect of the relative safety from crime is inconsistent to my 
hypothesis, suggesting that ordinary Mozambican citizens do not see their own 
personal safety as part of that same basket. In fact, it even suggests that those who 
feel safer now than under the old regime do not credit that safety to the advent of 
democracy.  
 
With respect to the relevance of official corruption, official corruption is to be 
significantly and negatively related to democracy, because official corruption 
creates public disgust and disillusionment (Diamond, 1997; Bratton, Mattes and 
Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). The effect of official corruption in Mozambique appears to 
be significantly and positively associated with support for democracy, because 
political corruption makes people demand clean and decent government, 
transparency, accountability, the rule of law and good governance.   
 
The positive stimulus of interpersonal discussion of politics on mass public 
commitment to democracy is due to the fact that these networks are based on trust 
and have great coverage (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944). This suggests 
that individuals not only acquire information through news media or formal 
education but can also learn from others, where they add their personal experiences 
to that of others (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). Thus, this also means that acquiring 
information from alternative informal sources also matters for democratic 
consolidation beyond obtaining information by being taught and, or from formal 
sources.  
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Considering the impacts of sources of information, positive attitudes to democracy 
– procedural understandings of and commitment to democracy – are more likely to 
be transmitted from relatively more independent or non-state controlled sources of 
information, because the state and or ruling party (i.e. Frelimo) subvert the quality 
of democracy and democratic procedures.  
 
Conventional views of African politics strongly suggest that Africans support 
democracy largely on the basis of substantive understandings of democracy (Ake, 
1996). However, although ‘what democracy does’, “its concrete outcomes” or “a 
specific content to policy” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) are more 
tangible aspects of democracy, in contrast, I found that “the struggle to determine 
those policies” (Diamond, 2005) or democratic rules or procedures are what 
matters positively to building and consolidating democracy.  
 
To finalize, the process of being committed to democracy in Mozambique is shaped 
by the larger legacies of Portuguese colonialism and the post independence civil 
war, especially its deleterious effects on formal education and news media, and also 
the Frelimo’s communist style party-state system legacy, especially its control over 
the society. It is from these legacies that Mozambicans collectively learn about 
democracy or become committed to democracy depending on how democracy 
performs.12 
 
Yet the legitimacy’ process is also shaped by the legacies played by an enormous 
information network of voter education campaigns in the 1994 founding elections 
involving “almost all the country broadcasting, video and advertisement 
companies, dozens of related institutions, and thousands of young Mozambicans” 
(de Maia, 1996) in explaining them the meaning of the concept of democracy as 
well as the long history of conflicts that were key to see or understand democracy 
procedurally. However, this type of conclusion may be more salient when tested 
                                                 
12 The notion of “collective” learning point to historical periods effects that impart a set of 
common lessons across all people in a country regardless of age or generation (Barner-Barry and 
Orenwein, 1985). The dramatic vents of political transitions, such as the total breakdown of the 
institutions and value structure of the ancient regime, or the founding election of a new regime, 
might provide such effects, creating re-socialization across all people and a society-wide transfer 
of regime loyalties (Bermeo, 1992; Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 2004; Gunther Montero and 
Torcal, 2004). As such, the macro-level crystallization of mass public attitudes in a new 
democracy may resemble the types of micro-level attitude change that occur in early adulthood in 
stable regimes (Jennings, 1989; Gibson and Gouws, 2003). See Mattes and Bratton, 2003. 
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Strategies to support the process of democratization  
 
Transposing these findings to policy and practice I raise some strategies to support 
the process of democratization in Mozambique. 
 
Procedural aspects of democracy should be taught at school or introduced into 
school curricula, since formal education appeared to be positively related to 
democracy as a set of procedures that ‘allow a free and equal voice in making 
decisions.’  
 
To increase the levels of actual commitment to democracy it is important to 
increase levels of information, especially by broadening access to formal education 
and independent news media. However, training programs and capacity building or 
civic education campaign at schools curricula and mass media about democratic 
citizenship and procedures, and rules to empower ordinary citizens on democratic 
issues are also relevant. This cognitive strategy should also be extended to non-
state aligned or relatively more independent organizations and religious leaders, 
since they matter positively in development of democratic commitments.  
 
To ordinary Mozambicans, they should engage more in interpersonal discussion of 
politics and participate more in collective action in order to build greater 
democratic legitimacy.  
 
Since people support democracy because they perceive that democracy works 
better than any other form of government worldwide experienced, Mozambicans’ 
democratic governments should improve their political performance in delivering 
political rights (including freedom to say what you think, to join any political 
organization, from false arrest, to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured, 
and the ability of ordinary people to influence government). But also economic 
reform should address problems of inequalities instead of just producing relatively 
strong economic growth and debt alleviation that are not being reflected at micro-




Finally, coming from reflection of low levels of commitment to democracy in 
Mozambique, to practitioners (such as members of parliament, political parties, and 
leaders of interest groups and movements) I emphasize the need “to enforce limits 
on state authority, no matter which party or faction may control the state at a given 
time” (Diamond, 1997). This is necessary to deep “democratic structures to make 
them more liberal, accessible, accountable, and representative; and strengthening 
the formal institutions of democracy, including parties, legislatures, and the judicial 
system” (Diamond, 1997). Thus, Mozambique’s highly presidentialized system of 
government should be converted to parliamentary system to make the government 
more accountable to the legislature. The judiciary should be more independent and 
autonomous “to enforce the law equally toward everyone, including those in 
government” (O’Donnell, 2005). The electoral institutions, including the 
Constitutional Council should be more independent, impartial or not controlled or 
dominated by the ruling party to improve the scope of political competition and of 
participation. Any government tentative of strategy of development without first 
making these political reforms will be a fallacy. 
 
 
Operationalization of the Variables, single items, two-
items constructs and multi items (composite indices) 
 
Commitment to democracy is measured by support (preference) for democracy and 
rejections of three forms of authoritarian regimes: one-party, military, and one-man 
rules. Support for democracy is measured by the question: “Which of these three 
statements is closest to your own opinion?” A. Democracy is preferable to any 
other kind of government; B. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government 
can be preferable; and C. For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of 
government we have’. Rejection of authoritarian regimes is measured by: “There 
are many ways of govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the 
following alternatives? A. Only one political party is allowed to stand for election 
and hold office; C. The army comes in to govern the country; and D. Elections and 
the Assembly of the Republic are abolished so that the President can decide 
everything. Those who prefer democracy and strongly disapprove of authoritarian 
regimes are deemed to be committed democrats. 
 
Commitment to democracy index 
Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted with eigenvalue greater than 
one (1.521), and common variance of 51 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s 
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Alpha =.65. Number of cases (n=1385). Factor loadings: rejection of one-man 
rule=.776, rejection of military rule=.709, rejection of one-party rule=.593 and 
support for democracy=.252. 
 
Procedural versus substantive understandings of democracy is measured by: 
“Which of the following statement is close to your view? Statement A or statement 
B.” Statement A: Democracy is worth having because it allows everyone a free and 
equal voice in making decisions. Statement B: Democracy is only worth having if it 
can address everyone’s basic needs. Respondents who say statement A are deemed 
to understand democracy procedurally – i.e. as an end in itself/what democracy is. 
 
Formal education is measured by: “What is the highest level of education you have 
completed?” 
 
Media exposure is measured by: “How often do you get news from television, 
radio, newspapers?” 
 
Media exposure index 
Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.659 and 
common variance of 65.994 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.73, 
number of cases (n=1399). Factor loadings: newspaper=.886, television=.855 and 
radio=.380. 
 
Interest in public affairs is measured by: “How interested are you in public 
affairs?”  
 
Interpersonal discussion of politics is measured by “How often do you discuss 
politics with friends or neighbors?” 
 
Contacted influential persons is measured by: “During the past year, how often 
have you contacted a political party official, an official of government ministry, a 
local councilor, a traditional ruler, a religious leader, other influential person for 
help to solve a problem or to give them your view?  
 
Affiliation in associations or group membership is measured by: “I am going to 
read you a list of voluntary organizations. For each tell me whether you are an 
official member, an active member, or not a member? A religious group (e.g. 
church or mosque), a trade union, a professional or business association, and a 
community development or self-help association. 
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Party identification is measured by: “Do you feel close to any particular political 
party? (If yes), which party is that? 
 
Political participation in collective action is measured by: “Here is a list of actions 
that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether 
you personally, have done any of these things during past year. (If not), would you 
do this if you had a chance? Attended a community meeting; got together with 
others to raise an issue; and attended a demonstration or protest march”. 
 
Participation in collective action index 
Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.218 and 
common variance of 58.65 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.6307, 
number of cases (n=1400). Factor loadings: got together with others to raise an 
issue=.813, attended a demonstration or protest march=.563 and attended a 
community meeting=.490. 
 
Delivery of political rights is measured by: “Please tell me if the following things 
are worse or better now than they used to be or about the same”: a) freedom to say 
what you think, b) freedom to join any political party you want, c) freedom from 
being arrested when you are innocent, d) freedom to choose who to vote for 
without feeling pressured, e) the ability of ordinary people to influence what 
government does. 
 
Delivery of political rights index 
Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =2.296, and 
common variance of 56.241 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.79.6, 
number of cases (n=1400). Factor loadings: freedom to join political 
organization=.780, freedom to choose who to vote without feeling pressured=.741, 
freedom to say what you think=.728, the ability to influence government=.571 and 
freedom from unjust arrest=.533. 
 
Perceived official corruption is measured by: “How many of the following do you 
think are involved in corruption: a) The president and officials in his office, b) 
elected leaders, c) government officials, d) the police, e) border officials, f) 
teachers and school administrators and g)  judges and magistrates. 
 
Perceived official corruption index 
Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =3.86, and 
common variance of 61.83 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.895, 
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number of cases (n=1393). Factor loadings: government officials=.881, elected 
leaders=.842, the president and officials in his office=.770, police=.704, judges and 
magistrates=.677, border officials=.652 and teachers and school 
administrators=.638. 
 
Performance of political incumbents is measured by: “do you approve or 
disapprove of the way that the following person has performed their jobs over the 
past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” a) The 
president, b) members of parliament, and c) the local mayor.  
 
Performance of political incumbents’ index 
Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.267 and 
common variance of 58.5 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.618, 
number of cases (n=1391). Factor loadings: the members of parliament=.818, the 
president=.681 and the local mayor=.366. 
 
Safety from crime or violence is measured by: “Please tell me if the following 
things are worse or better now than they used to be or about the same: safety from 
crime or violence.” 
 
Evaluations of economic reform is measured by: “Tell me if the following things 
are worse or better now than they use to be, or about the same”: a) the availability 
of goods, b) people’s standard of living, c) the availability of job opportunities? 
 
Evaluations of economic reform index 
Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =1.396, and 
common variance of 60.7 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.666, 
number of cases (n=1395). Factor loadings: people’s standard of living=.921, the 
availability of goods=.594 and the availability of job opportunities=.442. 
 
Government handling economy is measured by: “How well or badly would you say 
the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard 
enough about them to say”: a) managing the economy, b) keeping prices stable, c) 
creating jobs and d) narrowing gaps between rich and poor? 
 
Government handling economy index 
Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =1.714, and 
common variance of 56 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.73, 
number of cases (n=1400). Factor loadings: keeping prices stable=.766, creating 
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jobs=.744, narrowing gaps between rich and poor=.609 and managing the 
economy=.450. 
 
Relative economic evaluations is measured by: How would you rate a) the 
economic conditions in this country compared to those in neighboring countries, 
and b) your living conditions compared to those other Mozambicans? 
 
Relative economic evaluations construct 
Variables measuring relative country economic conditions and personal living 
conditions compared to others correlate to each other at r=.45** with reliability 
Alpha=.62 (n=1395). 
 
Present economic evaluations is measured by: “How would you rate the following 
a) present economic condition of this country, and b) your present living 
conditions?” 
 
Present economic evaluations construct 
Variables measuring the present country economic condition and personal living 
conditions correlate with each other at r=.469** with a reliability of Alpha=.64 
(n=1393). 
 
Retrospective economic evaluations is measured by: “How would you rate the 
following compared to twelve months ago a) the economic condition of this 
country, and b) your living conditions?” 
 
Retrospective economic evaluations construct 
Variables measuring retrospective country economic conditions and personal living 
conditions correlate to each other at r=.511** with reliability Alpha=.665 
(n=1386). 
 
Prospective economic evaluations is measured by: “How do you expect the 
following to be better or worse a) economic conditions in this country in twelve 
months time, and b) your living conditions in twelve months time?” 
 
Prospective economic evaluations construct 
Variables measuring prospective country economic conditions and personal living 
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